Information as concept and concept as information in the light of epistemology and methodology
| Authors | |
|---|---|
| Year of publication | 2019 |
| Type | Article in Periodical |
| Magazine / Source | Knihovna |
| MU Faculty or unit | |
| Citation | |
| web | https://knihovnarevue-en.nkp.cz/archives/2019-1/reviewed-articles/information-as-concept-and-concept-as-information-in-the-light-of-epistemology-and-methodology |
| Keywords | information; concept; definition; classification; epistemology; methodology; information science; conceptual analysis; content analysis; interpretation |
| Description | The paper deals with the definition and classification of the concept of information in terms of epistemology and methodology. It is divided into two parts: theoretical and analytical part. In the theoretical part, the concepts of epistemology, methodology and method are defined and their impact on the approaches in information science is examined. The paper then poses two basic epistemological questions and four approaches are differentiated: realism, scepticism, subjectivism and objectivism. Their relationship to methodology is examined and some examples of these trends in information science are provided. The notion of concept is defined and four basic approaches are identified: extreme realism, moderate realism, conceptualism and nominalism; some examples of these approaches in information science are shown. The paper then deals with the notion of concept, definition and classification and distinguishes three approaches to these scientific instruments: realism, instrumentalism and definition-rejecting approach. The following section deals with the analysis of four texts whose authors (Bates, Losee, Floridi and Goguen) are representative of the above approaches to epistemological and methodological issues. The analysis concludes that information is a transcendental concept that can be defined only verbally, and thus further use of the concept in information science should be questioned. |
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